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Abstract—Recently fault injection has increasingly been
used both to attack software applications, and to test
system robustness. Detecting fault injection vulnerabilities
has been approached with a variety of different but limited
methods. This paper proposes a general process without
these limitations that uses model checking to detect fault
injection vulnerabilities in binaries. The efficacy of this
process is demonstrated by detecting vulnerabilities in the
PRESENT binary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently fault injection has been increasingly used
both as a method to attack software applications, and to
test the robustness of software systems. Many systems
are particularly vulnerable to fault injection attacks due
to operating in hostile environments, i.e. environments
where an attacker may be able to perform physical
attacks on the system hardware. Many such attacks have
been demonstrated on various systems, showing that
different kinds of faults can be injected into various de-
vices [1], [2], [3]. Attacks can also be achieved through
software alone and do not require attacking the hardware
directly. A recent example of this is row hammer [4] that
has been exploited in various attacks [5], [6].
The wide variety of fault injection attacks and possible
impacts upon a system make it impossible to prevent
software from failing under all possible attacks [3].
Thus, recent work has approached the problem of fault
injection by limiting the scope of attacks, or limiting the
kinds of vulnerabilities analysed [7], [8], [9], [10], often
requiring specialised equipment.
This paper proposes an automated formal process
for the detection of fault injection vulnerabilities in
binaries. In particular, a process that can account for
many different kinds of fault injections and that does
not require extensive hardware or specialised equipment.
This process is achieved by simulating fault injection at-
tacks upon the executable binary for the given software,
and then using model checking to determine whether or
not the simulated fault injection attack violates properties
the software should maintain.
This paper presents an automated process for detect-
ing vulnerabilities in binaries using model checking.
The process begins with the executable binary that
represents the program to be considered. The valida-
tion of the binary involves checking various properties
using model checking to ensure the binary meets its
specification. Fault injection attacks are then simulated
on the executable binary, producing mutant binaries.
The properties are then model checked on the mutant
binaries. A difference in the result between validating
and checking the properties indicates a vulnerability to
the fault injection attack that was simulated.
This process provides a general approach that can
support detecting a wide variety of fault injection vul-
nerabilities in binaries by varying the fault model of the
fault injection. The strengths of this approach include
the following. By operating directly upon the binary,
fault injection vulnerabilities that cannot be detected
in source languages or intermediate representations can
be detected [11], [12]. Formal methods, here model
checking, ensure the rigour of the analysis and so ensure
that fault injection vulnerabilities that are detected are
real and not false positives. An automated process can
be easily iterated over various fault injection models and
approaches, and thus allows broad, or even complete,
coverage of possible fault injection attacks. Combining
automation, broad coverage, and formal methods, allows
the process to make strong guarantees about the vulner-
ability of a system that has been analysed.
To demonstrate the efficacy of this process, this paper
includes a case study of applying the process to the
PRESENT encryption algorithm [13], [14] with various
fault models1. PRESENT is a lightweight encryption
algorithm designed to be used on embedded devices, thus
making it an ideal choice to consider security critical
software in hostile environments. The process proposed
here was applied to the PRESENT binary with five
different fault models for a total of approximately 5700
experiments. These fault injections yielded a number
of infinite loops, and crashes, but also 9 vulnerabilities
where the encryption algorithm is completely bypassed.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows.
• Describing a general process that allows automated
detection of fault injection vulnerabilities in bina-
ries.
• An implementation of the process that allows easy
automation with existing tools.
• A case study demonstrating the efficacy of using
the process on the PRESENT algorithm.
• The identification of 9 fault injection vulnerabilities
in the PRESENT algorithm that bypass encryption.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II re-
calls background on fault injection attacks, model check-
ing, properties, and PRESENT. Section III introduces the
process proposed in this paper. Section IV overviews the
implementation and tools used to achieve the process.
Section V applies the process to the PRESENT algo-
rithm with five fault models and analyses the results.
Section VI discusses related work. Section VII concludes
and discusses future work.
II. BACKGROUND
This section recalls key concepts and information
useful to understanding the rest of the paper. These
are divided into four main areas: fault injection, model
checking, properties, and the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Fault Injection
Fault injection can be considered as an attack, when
an attacker targets the hardware of a system to create
an exploitable error at the software level. The goal
of such an attack is to cause a specific effect at the
hardware level, that in turn creates an exploitable change
in the software behaviour. The rest of this section recalls
key points regarding the kinds of fault injection attacks
considered here.
The hardware effect of a fault injection attack is
described through a fault model that specifies the nature
and scope of the induced modification. Typically such
1Other experimental results to illustrate properties and binary only
attacks are available in the long version of this paper [12].
attacks are achieved by changing a value stored in the
hardware, such as changing the value of a whole byte
[3]. Such hardware effects generally focus on the kind
of fault that can be created rather than the effect this has
on the software.
Simulating fault injection attacks in an experimental
environment can be done in two ways: reproducing
the attack on the hardware, or simulating the attack
with software. Reproducing the attack using hardware
technology is relatively difficult and expensive, since
specialised hardware must be used to inject the fault
(e.g. using a laser [7], or electromagnetic pulse [8]).
Comparatively, simulating with software is easy and
cheap because this requires only modification to the
executable binary and no specialised hardware. Since the
goal in this paper is to develop an efficient process that
can be implemented with a software tool chain, the rest
of this paper will only consider software simulations.
Software simulation attacks can also be classified into
two kinds of fault injection attacks, run time and compile
time. Run time fault injection attacks are those that occur
only while the code being attacked is being executed.
Compile time fault injection attacks are those that occur
at any time starting form compilation of the code, and up
until just prior to execution. This paper considers only
compile time fault injection attacks since this captures
many run time faults as well and also builds towards
future work (see Section VII-A).
B. Model checking
Model checking is a formal method for determining
whether properties hold on a model [15]. Model check-
ing has the advantage that all possible states of the model
are considered, and so is guaranteed to be able to answer
whether or not a property holds for a given model.
The model is a representation of the program or
system being considered. A good model is able to
represent all the possible states and transitions that the
program can achieve. In this work, the model represents
an executable binary program.
The cost of model checking comes in the potential
exponential complexity used to consider all the possibly
infinite states of a model. However, for limited models,
model checking is highly efficient and precise. Further,
various approaches have been used to make model
checking efficient even for large and complex models
(or programs) [16].
Bounded model checking is a refinement of model
checking that alleviates some of the issues with possibly
infinite complexity by bounding the checking [17]. The
key idea in bounded model checking is to put a bound
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on parts of the model that could be infinite (or at least
extremely large). For example, checking a program with
a loop, going through hundreds or millions of iterations
could be very costly for model checking. However,
bounded model checking of such an example could limit
the number of times to iterate through a loop. Thus,
bounded model checking allows limits to be placed upon
such potentially unbounded aspects of model checking.
C. Properties
To perform model checking requires specifying the
properties to be checked upon the model. There are two
main kinds of properties that can be checked safety,
and liveness [15]. Safety properties are used to express
that certain propositions hold when they are encountered.
Liveness properties express that propositions hold over
some temporal dimension. This paper only considers
safety properties since these are clearer, more intuitive
to represent, and sufficient to illustrate the feasibility of
the process. Liveness properties can also be checked
in a similar manner, although this is not presented
in this paper, for further details see the discussion in
Section VII-A.
Safety properties can be expressed by simple propo-
sitions that can be annotated into the code of the
program being considered. Generally such properties
support: negation, equality, inequality, conjunction, and
disjunction. These can be defined upon values or states
within the model (and thus the binary being checked).
D. The PRESENT Algorithm
PRESENT [13], [14] is a lightweight block cipher
designed for use on low power and CPU constrained
devices. The PRESENT algorithm consists of 31 rounds
of a Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) with block
size of 64 bits. The canonical implementation2 supports
2Available at http://www.lightweightcrypto.org/implementations.php
key lengths of 80 or 128 bits. The core encryption
algorithm is the same for both 80 and 128 bit keys.
The version of PRESENT analysed here is the canon-
ical version in C for 32 bit architectures (size optimised,
80 bit key) with minor modifications to change loop
types (due to limitations in the tools used, see Sec-
tion VII-A for further discussion of these).
III. PROCESS
This section details the process presented in this paper
for detecting fault injection vulnerability in binaries.
An overview of the process is as follows (and shown in
Figure 1). Prior to starting the process, the source code,
and the properties represented by annotations within
the source code, must be defined. The preparation step
for the process is then to compile the source code
and properties to produce an executable binary in a
manner that preserves the properties as annotations. The
properties are validated to hold on the executable binary
using model checking. The executable binary is then
injected with simulated faults to produce mutant binaries.
The properties are then checked upon the mutant binaries
again using model checking. A difference in the results
of validation and checking the properties indicates a
vulnerability to the simulated fault injection. The rest
of this section details this process.
The choice to start the preparation with the source
code and not the binary is made for illustrative clarity
and ease of use for the software developer, since defining
properties over binaries is more arduous. However, most
aspects of the process do not rely upon this choice, and
future work is to be able to start directly from the binary
(further discussion in Section VII-A)
Since this paper considers fault injection attacks upon
the binary it is necessary to compile the source code
(and here properties) into an executable binary. This
executable binary represents the software application that
would be executed by the system in practice. Thus to
simulate fault injection attacks on the actual system,
the executable binary must be used in the simulation.
For the process here the compilation must maintain
the properties, and so compilation must maintain the
properties as annotations in the executable binary.
The properties are validated to hold upon the exe-
cutable binary using model checking. This ensures that
the executable binary meets the specification of the
properties. If there is some other error in the source
code or compilation, this can be detected here and not
be (incorrectly) attributed to fault injection vulnerability.
Next is the simulation of the fault injection on the exe-
cutable binary to produce mutant binaries. This simulates
3
Source
Code &
Properties G
C
C
Executable
Binary
(with
Properties) M
C
-S
em
a LLVM-IR
(with
Properties) LL
B
M
C
Validation
Result
Mutant
Binaries
(with
Properties) M
C
-S
em
a Mutant
LLVM-IRs
(with
Properties) L
L
B
M
C
Checking
Results
Fault Injections Differences?
Fig. 2: Implementation Diagram
the actual fault injection attacks and produces mutant
executable binaries that represent the executable binary
after the attacks have been effected.
Lastly, the validation results from model checking the
executable binary are compared with the checking results
from model checking each mutant binary. Differences in
property checking outputs indicate that the fault that was
injected yields a change in behaviour that violates the
properties, and so could be exploited by an attacker.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of the pro-
cess from the previous section3. The implementation
here exploits currently available tools where possible,
despite some having significant limitations. This choice
was made in order to focus upon a simple and feasible
implementation of the process. For discussion of the
limitations of the tools used in the implementation here,
please refer to Section VII-A.
An overview of the implementation is as follows,
and shown in Figure 2. The implementation begins
with the source code written in the C language and
the properties represented in the source code by assert
statements. The source code and properties are compiled
to an executable binary by the GNU C Compiler (GCC)
[18]. The executable binary (including the properties
contained within) is transformed into an intermediate
representation in Low Level Virtual Machine Interme-
diate Language (LLVM-IR) by the Machine Code Se-
mantics (MC-Sema) tool [19]. The properties are then
checked on the intermediate representation using the
Low Level Bounded Model Checker (LLBMC) [20],
[21]. An automated fault injection tool then produces
mutant binaries by injecting faults into the executable
3A detailed description of the implementation designed to allow
reproduction is in the long version of this paper [12].
binary according to the tool’s fault model. The steps
to model check the properties on the executable binary
are then repeated for each mutant binary. Finally, the
results of model checking the executable binary and each
mutant binary are compared for differences by matching
the outputs of LLBMC.
V. CASE STUDY: PRESENT
This section presents a case study of five different fault
injection attacks against the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Experimental Design
All the experiments tested a single property to capture
the capability of a fault injection attack to bypass the
encryption algorithm. The property checked whether the
“ciphertext” at the end of the encryption was different
to the “plaintext”. Thus, violations of this property
indicated the encryption algorithm had been effectively
bypassed. The result of each fault injected mutant binary
were thus classified into one of: passed where model
checking of all properties succeeded; infinite loop when
the fault caused an infinite loop in model checking;
crashed when the fault caused the program to crash;
and vulnerable when the fault caused the property to
be violated.
The five fault models are: modifying an unconditional
jump (JMP) to jump to a new address; modifying a
conditional jump (JBE) to jump to a new address; zero
1 byte (Z1B) that sets a single byte to zero; zero 2
bytes (Z2B) that sets two consecutive bytes to zero; and
NOP’ing an instruction (NOP) that sets a byte to a non-
operation code. Each is detailed below when considering
the results for that fault model.
B. Results Overview
An overview of the results for injecting these fault
models in all possible locations in the PRESENT binary
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can be seen in Table I. All the fault models tested
caused crashes, with these being most common with the
Z2B and NOP fault models. Infinite loops were also
quite common, either through modification of jumps,
damaging iterator code, or damaging conditionals. Vul-
nerabilities were quite rare, which was as expected, with
all arising from the jump fault models. The rest of
this section considers each of the fault models and the
associated experimental results in detail.
Fault Model Colour
Result JMP JBE Z1B Z2B NOP
Passed 1632 502 905 855 784
Infinite Loop 106 0 53 49 93
Crashed 62 60 172 225 248
Vulnerable 1 8 0 0 0
TABLE I: Overview of Fault Injection Results.
C. Unconditional Jump
The fault model for this experiment was to identify
unconditional jump instructions and change their target.
For simplicity only increasing the value of the target
address was considered (i.e. jumping relatively forward,
not relatively backwards). Column JMP of Table I
presents aggregate results. There are 10 unconditional
jumps in the PRESENT binary at addresses 0x0120,
0x014B, 0x0155, 0x018C, 0x01D3, 0x0207, 0x02D4,
0x0313, 0x0361, and 0x0447. The only jump that yielded
a vulnerability was at 0x014B, and the details are shown
in Figure 3 showing the offsets that could be jumped to
and the result of checking each mutant (and the blue box
indicating the end of the experiment range).
Most of the significant changes here were infinite
loops, with a significant number of crashes, and a
single vulnerability that skipped the entire encryption
algorithm. The infinite loops are largely as expected,
since the modified jump can easily skip loop iterator
increment code. The crashes are also to be expected,
mostly related to jumping to incorrect byte offsets for
the instructions, and so yielding invalid instructions (or
instructions that crash in other ways such as trying to
read invalid memory segments). The single vulnerability
was when the jump for the first loop of the encryption
algorithm skips over the entire encryption, going straight
to the end of the code. Only a single instance was found
as most jumps were “short” (single byte offset), meaning
they could not bypass significant amounts of code.
D. Conditional Jump
The conditional jump fault model changes targets
similar to the unconditional jump fault model. Column
”To Offset Starting 0x0150”
Fig. 3: Unconditional Jumps from Jump at 0x014B
”To Offset Starting 0x043E”
Fig. 4: Conditional Jumps from Jump at 0x043C
JBE of Table I presents the summaries for the two
conditional jumps at addresses 0x02C9 and 0x043C.
Again vulnerabilities were only found in one at 0x043C
and these are detailed in Figure 4.
Here no infinite loops were detected likely due to the
conditions always being triggered at least once, instead
only crashes where the unconditional jumps were instead
targeting bad locations in the code leading to incorrect
“instructions”. More interesting are the vulnerabilities
that fall into two groups. The first group (the first three in
the map) jumped to later assignment instructions (includ-
ing incorrectly offset locations) that ended up bypassing
the correct loop controls (by changing values used for
later loop control flow), and eventually skipping the
encryption algorithm. The second group (the remaining
five) simply jumped to the end of the encryption code,
merely bypassing the encryption algorithm.
E. Zero 1 Byte
Another fault model to test automating the process
over a larger number of mutants was to set a single
byte to zero. There are 1130 bytes in the PRESENT
executable binary, and each was set to zero in a different
mutant, yielding the results shown in the Z1B column
of Table I. Detailed results showing which faulted bytes
yield which effect can be seen in the map in Figure 5.
No fault injection vulnerabilities to this fault model
were detected, although many crashes and infinite loops
were introduced. This is not a surprising result, since
the PRESENT source code has two top-level loops that
both perform some part of the encryption. Thus, although
setting one byte to zero could skip either one of these, it
would require two (non-consecutive) zero one byte fault
injection attacks to be “vulnerable” here.
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F. Zero 2 Bytes
A similar test of automation over many mutants was
the fault model that sets two consecutive bytes to zero.
There are 1129 possible mutant binaries under this fault
model. Their results shown in the Z2B column of Table I,
and the map showing the starting index of the two bytes
is shown in Figure 6.
Similar to the zero 1 byte fault injection model, no
vulnerabilities were detected. Even more crashes were
introduced, although a few less infinite loops. Generally
this is due to instructions being damaged to yield failure,
either by being simply incomprehensible, or by pushing
memory access outside acceptable bounds.
G. NOP Code 1 Byte
The last fault model for this experiment was to set
each byte to the instruction code for a non-operation
(NOP). This fault injection attack was applied to each
of the 1130 bytes to ensure complete coverage (and
so in some cases had effects other than NOP’ing an
instruction). Column NOP of Table I summarises these
results, with the detailed map in Figure 7.
This approach turned out to be even more destructive
than either of the zero byte fault models. Although more
crashes were introduced, the almost doubling of infinite
loops was an unexpected result that could be investigated
further in future. No vulnerabilities were detected here
which aligns with the prior results that binaries are fairly
resistant to these kinds of byte attacks.
H. A Note on Scalability
The experiments were conducted on a variety of
devices with different hardware and configurations (all
were virtual machines running Ubuntu X64). The dis-
tribution was due to different experiments being run at
different times, however this makes it impossible to pro-
vide consistent runtime information for the experiments.
That said, in general the model checking (either vali-
dation or checking) was by far the most expensive in
terms of runtime. No attempt was made to optimise
or modify the settings of LLBMC to improve runtime,
despite some results taking many minutes. This is due to
the process being trivially parallisable, since each mutant
can be checked independently.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are various related works that consider fault in-
jection vulnerability and either formal methods or broad
testing. This section discusses some key differences with
respect to the process and approach used here.
Several recent works have considered formal ap-
proaches for handling fault injection vulnerabilities [9],
[22], [23], [11], [10]. Both [9] and [10] use formal
methods to prove the efficacy of countermeasures, the
former for one specific implementation, and the latter
as applied to extremely small assembly code fragments.
However, they consider only a single fault model, and
very limited capabilities of fault injection, the latter
not even on the program as a whole. The works [22],
[23], [11] all have similar proposals to the process
here, albeit in more limited manners. The SymPLFIED
framework [22] that exploits symbolic execution and
model checking to detect fault vulnerabilities in MIPS
assembly code. However, the SymPLFIED approach
cannot operate on binaries or give concrete answers
about the error, instead tracking “error” states as in
taint analysis. Lazart presented in [23] operates only
on LLVM-IR, and only considers fault injections upon
control flow of the program. In [11] this is combined
with the Embedded Fault Simulator (EFS) [24] to also
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support binary level faults on the hardware, but this
extension only supports NOP’ing instructions.
Less closely related works include: [25] that tests
for robustness using both software and hardware fault
injection, the latter to validate the former; and [26] that
start from the hardware model and use this to simulate
faults on the assembly code of a program.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Fault injection has recently been increasingly used
to attack software applications, and test system robust-
ness. This paper presents a formal process that uses
model checking to detect fault injection vulnerabilities
in binaries. This process supports the detection of many
varieties of fault injection vulnerabilities, and does not
rely on any particular system architecture, fault model, or
other restricted choices (as are common in the literature).
Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of the
process by testing a variety of fault models on the
PRESENT binary. For naive fault models the (Z1B, Z2B,
and NOP) this yielded many infinite loops and program
crashes, but no attacks to skip the encryption algorithm.
However, when (both unconditional and conditional)
jump instructions were targeted, 9 fault injection vul-
nerabilities were found that allow complete bypassing
of the PRESENT algorithm.
A. Future Work
There are several limitations with the implementa-
tion chosen here that provide opportunities for future
research. Indeed the implementation used was merely the
easiest to combine effectively to implement the process.
The choice to use MC-Sema was to be able to work
with LLVM-IR. The choice of LLVM-IR is due to
this being a widely used intermediate representation
that is supported by many tools. However, there are
limitations with MC-Sema that may limit future work.
MC-Sema supports only (some of) the instructions of
X86 architecture [19] and so future work is to replace
MC-Sema and/or expand to implement the process for
other architectures.
The LLBMC model checker is sufficient for the safety
properties but does not support liveness properties. Thus
although LLBMC was sufficient for the proof of concept
here, future work will exploit a non-bounded model
checker that can also accept liveness properties. In partic-
ular a model checker that can produce traces (LLBMC
can, but not combined with MC-Sema) would aide in
understanding vulnerabilities and analysing results.
Fault injection was implemented with custom tools for
this work, although there already exist several tools to
simulate fault injection attacks on software [27], [28].
However, these tools are limited by various choices
that make unsuitable for the process here (hence their
lack of use in the implementation). Several are only
able to inject faults into intermediate representations,
and not into executable binaries [29], [23], [30], thus
being unable to simulate faults that appear only at the
executable binary level. Others have different limitations,
such as: specific hardware platforms [22], [31], spe-
cific source code languages [32], [9], [30], or requiring
simulating drivers [33]. Despite these limitations, many
include useful techniques or developments that could be
incorporated into future development of a general fault
injection tool for executable binaries.
Complementary research is to explore ways to inject
faults intelligently. This could exploit knowledge of the
property to inject faults that would lead to property
violations, yielding improved efficiency of experiments.
Regarding properties, another area of future work is to
consider how to extract properties automatically from the
binary (or source code). There is some existing work in
this area [34], [35] although they focus upon high level
behaviour rather than binary code.
Currently the process identifies vulnerabilities, but
does not suggest fixes or countermeasures. Automati-
cally generating countermeasures is non-trivial, although
if countermeasures to particular faults are known future
work could suggest or implement them automatically.
Perhaps more significantly, these countermeasures could
be checked immediately using the process here and so
their effectiveness verified immediately.
There are also several directions related to case
studies. The analysis of PRESENT here was proof-of-
concept to demonstrate the process, and indeed some of
the “passed” results here correspond to known differen-
tial attacks against PRESENT [36], [37]. Applying the
process with more properties to consider, and a better
suite of fault models would yield more complete results
on the vulnerability of the PRESENT binary.
Future case studies could consider other security criti-
cal software, e.g. encryption algorithms, mission critical
software, embedded device kernels, and also software
that has implemented countermeasures.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Bar-El, H. Choukri, D. Naccache, M. Tunstall, and C. Whelan,
“The sorcerer’s apprentice guide to fault attacks.” IACR Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, vol. 2004, p. 100, 2004.
[2] S. Guilley, L. Sauvage, J.-L. Danger, and N. Selmane, “Fault
injection resilience,” in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryp-
tography (FDTC), 2010 Workshop on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 51–65.
7
[3] I. Verbauwhede, D. Karaklajic, and J.-M. Schmidt, “The fault
attack jungle-a classification model to guide you,” in Fault Di-
agnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), 2011 Workshop
on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 3–8.
[4] Y. Kim, R. Daly, J. Kim, C. Fallin, J. H. Lee, D. Lee, C. Wilker-
son, K. Lai, and O. Mutlu, “Flipping bits in memory without
accessing them: An experimental study of dram disturbance
errors,” in ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 42,
no. 3. IEEE Press, 2014, pp. 361–372.
[5] M. Seaborn and T. Dullien, “Exploiting the dram rowhammer
bug to gain kernel privileges,” Black Hat, 2015.
[6] K. S. Yim, “The rowhammer attack injection methodology,” in
Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), 2016 IEEE 35th Sympo-
sium on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–10.
[7] A. Barenghi, L. Breveglieri, I. Koren, and D. Naccache, “Fault
injection attacks on cryptographic devices: Theory, practice, and
countermeasures,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 11, pp.
3056–3076, 2012.
[8] N. Moro, A. Dehbaoui, K. Heydemann, B. Robisson, and E. En-
crenaz, “Electromagnetic fault injection: towards a fault model
on a 32-bit microcontroller,” in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance
in Cryptography (FDTC), 2013 Workshop on. IEEE, 2013, pp.
77–88.
[9] M. Christofi, B. Chetali, and L. Goubin, “Formal verification
of an implementation of CRT-RSA vigilant’s algorithm,” in
PROOFS Workshop: Pre-proceedings, 2013, p. 28.
[10] N. Moro, K. Heydemann, E. Encrenaz, and B. Robisson, “Formal
verification of a software countermeasure against instruction skip
attacks,” Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 4, no. 3, pp.
145–156, 2014.
[11] L. Rivière, M.-L. Potet, T.-H. Le, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and
M. Puys, “Combining high-level and low-level approaches to
evaluate software implementations robustness against multiple
fault injection attacks,” in International Symposium on Founda-
tions and Practice of Security. Springer, 2014, pp. 92–111.
[12] T. Given-Wilson, N. Jafri, J.-L. Lanet, and A. Legay, “An
Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulner-
abilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT – Extended
Version,” Apr. 2017, working paper or preprint.
[13] A. Bogdanov, L. R. Knudsen, G. Leander, C. Paar, A. Poschmann,
M. J. Robshaw, Y. Seurin, and C. Vikkelsoe, “Present: An
ultra-lightweight block cipher,” in International Workshop on
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems. Springer,
2007, pp. 450–466.
[14] L. R. Knudsen and G. Leander, “Present–block cipher,” in
Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, 2011,
pp. 953–955.
[15] C. Baier, J.-P. Katoen, and K. G. Larsen, Principles of model
checking. MIT press, 2008.
[16] J. Kinder, S. Katzenbeisser, C. Schallhart, and H. Veith, “Proac-
tive detection of computer worms using model checking,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 7, no. 4,
pp. 424–438, 2010.
[17] A. Biere, A. Cimatti, E. M. Clarke, O. Strichman, and Y. Zhu,
“Bounded model checking,” Advances in computers, vol. 58, pp.
117–148, 2003.
[18] B. Gough, GNU scientific library reference manual. Network
Theory Ltd., 2009.
[19] Trail of bits, “Mc-semantics,” 2016,
https://github.com/trailofbits/mcsema.
[20] F. Merz, S. Falke, and C. Sinz, “LLBMC: Bounded model
checking of C and C++ programs using a compiler IR,” in
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Verified
Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments, ser. VSTTE’12. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012, pp. 146–161.
[21] C. Sinz, F. Merz, and S. Falke, “LLBMC: A bounded model
checker for LLVM’s intermediate representation - (competition
contribution),” in Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and
Analysis of Systems - 18th International Conference, TACAS
2012, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory
and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2012, Tallinn, Estonia, March
24 - April 1, 2012. Proceedings, 2012, pp. 542–544.
[22] K. Pattabiraman, N. Nakka, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. Iyer, “Sym-
PLFIED: Symbolic program-level fault injection and error de-
tection framework,” in 2008 IEEE International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks With FTCS and DCC (DSN).
IEEE, 2008, pp. 472–481.
[23] M.-L. Potet, L. Mounier, M. Puys, and L. Dureuil, “Lazart:
A symbolic approach for evaluation the robustness of secured
codes against control flow injections,” in 2014 IEEE Seventh
International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and
Validation. IEEE, 2014, pp. 213–222.
[24] M. Berthier, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, T.-H. Le, L. Rivière,
and V. Servant, “Idea: embedded fault injection simulator on
smartcard,” in International Symposium on Engineering Secure
Software and Systems. Springer, 2014, pp. 222–229.
[25] A. Ademaj, P. Grillinger, P. Herout, and J. Hlavicka, “Fault
tolerance evaluation using two software based fault injection
methods,” in On-Line Testing Workshop, 2002. Proceedings of
the Eighth IEEE International. IEEE, 2002, pp. 21–25.
[26] L. Dureuil, M.-L. Potet, P. de Choudens, C. Dumas, and
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